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Abstract
We develop a model of trade between identical countries. Workers endogenously
acquire skills that are imperfectly observed by firms, who therefore use aggregate coun-
try investment as the prior when evaluating workers. This creates an informational
externality interacting with general equilibrium effects on each country’s skill premium.
Asymmetric equilibria with comparative advantages exist even when there is a unique
equilibrium under autarky. Symmetric, no-trade equilibria may be unstable under free
trade. Welfare effects are ambiguous: trade may be Pareto improving even if it leads to
an equilibrium with rich and poor countries, with no special advantage to country size.
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I Introduction
In this paper we develop a stylized model of international trade in which a country can
establish a reputation for having a high quality labor force, providing new insights to the
understanding of the causes of trade, specialization, and inequality across countries.
A reputation for high or low quality of the labor force may arise when employers do
not perfectly observe workers’ competencies and skills. Workers acquire human capital not
only through education and labor market experience, but also with personal effort and
investments that are not as easily observable. Our paper focuses on this informational
asymmetry, showing that it may generate reputational differences across countries that are
self-fulfilling.
The labor economics literature has shown that informational asymmetries of this kind
are empirically relevant. Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) first
showed that employers’ learning is significant, providing support to the assumption that
employers initially observe workers’ skills with noise.1 Recent literature confirms these
results2 suggesting a significant scope for the mechanism proposed in this paper to play
a role in determining workers’ wage distribution, incentives to acquire skills, and sorting
across industries.
Based on this evidence, one cannot dismiss the possibility that labor market informa-
tional asymmetries may also play a role in explaining, at least in part, trade and special-
ization across countries. In this paper, we demonstrate that they are sufficient to generate
self-fulfilling cross-country differences in reputation that imply human capital differences,
trade, and specialization between otherwise identical countries. There is arguably an incom-
plete understanding of the patterns of trade and specialization observed in the real world,
which suggests that exploring alternative models could provide new insights.3
In our model, technology has constant returns to scale, a country is defined as a labor
market, and international trade is frictionless. Countries are symmetric in every respect,
1In most of the literature, the identification of the main effect exploits panel data where workers are
observed over time. If employers imperfectly observe workers’ skills, but learn over time through the obser-
vation of productivity signals, then as tenure increases wages should become more correlated with measures
of productivity available to the researcher (typically, workers’ scores in aptitude tests).
2In particular, Lange (2007) measured the “speed” of employer learning finding that, according to the
best estimates, it takes three years for an employer to reduce her expectation error to 50 percent of its initial
value, and 26 years to reduce it to less than 10 percent of its initial value. Note that average employer
tenure is currently just above 4 years on average, (January 2016, see the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
news release “Employee Tenure”, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.toc.htm, last accessed: August
2, 2017). See also Scho¨nberg (2007), Pinkston (2009), and Kahn and Lange (2014) using U.S. data, and
Lesner (2017) with Danish data. Cornwell et al. (2017) use Brazilian data to show that employer variation
in workers’ perceived race significantly affects wages.
3A full empirical investigation of the model implications, which would require accounting for (and sepa-
rately identifying) other relevant factors, is outside the scope of this paper.
1
therefore the model always admits symmetric equilibria that replicate autarky, without
gainful trade. The only aspect of the model that is non-standard is workers’ skill acquisition.
Our main questions are whether there exist conditions under which there also are equilibria
with asymmetric country reputations for skill investments and what are the properties of
such equilibria.
Workers can acquire skills at a cost that varies across workers. There are two sectors de-
manding labor, a “high tech” sector and a “low tech” sector, and skills increase productivity
only in the high tech sector. Incentives to acquire skills are affected by an informational
asymmetry: workers’ skills are only observed by employers with noise, through a signal of
productivity that may be thought of as aggregating information provided by the worker’s
curriculum, interviews, and observation in the workplace. A worker without skills, which
we henceforth call an unqualified worker, may send a good signal, but this is less likely than
a qualified worker (a worker with skills) sending a good signal.
Before observing the noisy signal, the prior probability of investment is determined
in each country by aggregate investment rates summarized by the proportion of qualified
workers. The probability of investment of each worker is then computed using her signal, but
is also affected by the prior. Hence, the actual proportion of qualified workers, together with
endogenous relative prices, determines incentives to invest. There is no point in investing
in skills if there are very few qualified workers in the country because firms will interpret
a good signal as most likely being noise and the good signal will raise the wage very little.
Symmetrically, if almost all workers invest, firms will ignore bad signals as “bad luck”, and,
again, there is no point in investing since all workers get high wages regardless of the signal.
Incentives to invest are therefore at the highest at some intermediate level of aggregate
investment because this is when firms will pay most attention to the noisy signals.
Hence, starting from a relatively low level of investments, the value to acquire human
capital will increase if the proportion of skilled workers in the economy increases as the
signal to noise ratio decreases. Working against this there are relative price effects that
make the high tech good less valuable when its supply increases, but these effects are smaller
when countries trade than in autarky. Additionally, when skills increase in one country, the
incentives to acquire skills in the other country are unambiguously reduced because of the
price effects. Hence, an asymmetric allocation of human capital and goods production may
arise even if there are no fundamental differences between the countries. As far as we know,
this is an explanation of trade and specialization that is novel in the international trade
literature. What is crucial for this result is that the reputation for having a qualified labor
force is like a public good, operating within a country regardless of its size.
While our mechanism is novel, there are some similarities with models of agglomeration.
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Scale economies and network effects can also create asymmetries between countries. How-
ever, these models usually start with some exogenous differences that are being accentuated
in equilibrium. Moreover, in existing models it is typically an advantage to have a large
domestic market, whereas in our model there is no systematic effect favoring large countries.
It is not the number, but the proportion of qualified workers that is critical in generating
the reputational externality. This is because employers, when assessing workers, use the
proportion of qualified worker as their prior for human capital investment. A worker is
more likely to be qualified the higher the proportion of qualified workers there are in her
country.
We highlight this irrelevance of country size by showing that there is no systematic
advantage to large economies. In many parameterizations where country sizes are allowed
to differ, there is an equilibrium with the large country specializing in the high tech industry
as well as an equilibrium in which the small country is the richer. Which of these equilibria
leads to more inequality or higher welfare is also a matter of parameter choices.
Asymmetric equilibria arise under free trade, but as already noted, there is always at
least one symmetric equilibrium with no gainful trade that replicates the autarky allocation.
One may therefore ask whether coordinating on an asymmetric equilibrium is plausible, and
several properties of our model suggest that it may be.4 First, this is not a model in which
certain countries are trapped in a coordination failure and others are not. Incentives in one
country depend on investments in the other and relative price effects are a crucial component
in the model. Asymmetric equilibria may therefore occur even if the autarky equilibrium is
unique. Moreover, the stability conditions under autarky differ from the stability conditions
under free trade. Opening up international trade may destabilize the unique and stable
autarky equilibrium, so cross country income differences may be an inevitable aspect of
free trade even if there are no exogenous differences that “explain” which country becomes
richer.
In any asymmetric equilibrium, a country with more human capital is richer and better
off than the other country. However, this does not necessarily imply that the poor country
is worse off under trade than in autarky. Welfare in the poor country can go either way, but
we emphasize the less intuitive possibility by generating an example where an asymmetric
equilibrium Pareto dominates the autarky equilibrium. The intuition is that an increase in
the skill level abroad may drive down the relative price of the high-tech good so much that
exchanging the low-tech good for the high-tech good generates higher welfare in the poor
country compared to domestic production.
4Matsuyama (2002) argues that multiplicity by itself does not offer a compelling reason for observed
asymmetries.
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Our results are robust to introducing exogenous productivity differences. If one country
has a “fundamental” comparative advantage in the high-tech industry, it may still special-
ize as a low-tech industry as a result of the mechanism in our model, provided that the
exogenous differences are not too large.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the contribution
of this paper relative to existing literature. Section III introduces the model, defines the
equilibrium, and shows that it can be characterized as a planner’s problem, simplifying
the analysis that follows. Section IV characterizes the equilibria under autarky. The main
result, the existence of equilibria with trade and specialization, is presented in Section
V. Section VI discusses the stability and welfare properties of equilibria with trade, and
the irrelevance of size. Section VII concludes discussing the robustness of the results to
extending the model to multiple countries, to including physical capital in the production,
and migration.
II Related literature
Our main contribution to the literature is to suggest a novel source of trade and compara-
tive advantage between identical countries. There are several papers in the literature that
include some of the crucial elements of our model, imperfectly observed human capital accu-
mulation, but in those models either some exogenous differences are posited, or equilibrium
multiplicity in a baseline autarky model is the driving source of specialization.
Our model relates to a literature on trade and endogenous skill formation initiated by
Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983), who develop a general equilibrium model where the driver
of trade is endogenous human capital acquisition. As in our model, the factors of production
are skilled and unskilled labor, but countries specialize because of exogenous differences in
the availability of inputs needed to acquire human capital, generating what we refer to as
price effects. In our setup instead, countries are identical also in the cost of acquiring human
capital.5
Among the papers presenting models with asymmetric information, Grossman and
Maggi (2000) and Grossman (2004) have elements that are similar to our setup: a Hecksher-
Ohlin model with imperfectly observable skills. Their focus is on comparative statics with
respect to changes in the skill distribution. For their purposes it is sufficient to consider
5The focus of this literature is mainly in showing how even if factor price equalization holds (for the
marginal worker), trade induces different incentives to acquire human capital across countries. For recent
extensions see also Ranjan (2001), Falvey et al. (2010), Auer (2015), Unel (2015), Blanchard and Willmann
(2016), and Danziger (2017). In some cases, the exogenous country differences are assumed by analyzing
the effects of trade on a small open economy that takes the world price as given, as in Cartiglia (1997),
Bougheas et al. (2011), Bonfatti and Ghatak (2013), or Harris and Robertson (2013).
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how trade is affected by exogenous differences in the talent distribution across countries,
therefore they ignore the incentives to acquire skills that are central in our model.6
Costinot (2009), like us, seeks to formulate a more fundamental theory of comparative
advantage. The technology is also based on the idea that human capital is more important
for some firms than for others. The main difference is that the model ultimately derives cross
country differences from exogenous differences in institutional quality and human capital.
Chisik (2003) derives trade in a model where products may acquire, in equilibrium,
different reputation for quality. Self-fulfilling reputation determines the average quality
of a country exports, and comparative advantages arise endogenously because countries
coordinate on selecting different equilibria.7 Similarly, in Chatterjee (2017) comparative
advantages emerge endogenously as a Nash equilibrium of a game in which countries choose
policies that affect sector-specific productivities or relative factor endowments. In these
papers equilibrium multiplicity is needed to generate the comparative advantage. In our
model instead, trade may arise even when there is a unique autarky equilibrium.
While our underlying assumptions are very different, our model shares many features
with trade models with increasing returns (Ethier (1982), Krugman (1980)), their versions
usually referred to as “agglomeration models” (Krugman and Venables (1995), Puga and
Venables (1999)), and the “symmetry-breaking” literature (see Matsuyama (1996, 2004)).
Agglomeration models can sustain a concentration of (high-income) manufacturing because
production costs decrease with the size of the industry. Manufactured goods are inputs in
the production of other goods, implying that being close to other producers saves on trans-
portation costs. This creates incentives to concentrate production. When production costs
are neither too small nor too large, there are equilibria where manufacturing is concentrated
in one country that becomes richer.
While our model is considerably less complicated and closer to the neoclassical bench-
mark than models with increasing returns, there is a close similarity in how a pecuniary
6A number of papers study the effects various informational asymmetries on trade. Their focus is essen-
tially on analyzing the effects of asymmetric information and not on studying how trade arises in equilibrium.
Vogel (2007), focuses on the effect of institutional quality reducing workers’ moral hazard. Davidson and
Sly (2014), focus on how opening to trade affects one country’s distortions in human capital accumulations
when education has a signaling role. Park (2011) analyzes trade agreements under imperfect public moni-
toring, Zhang (2012) consider effects of asymmetric information when exporters are credit constrained, and
Creane and Jeitschko (2016) show that weak institutions may result in welfare-reducing trade in an adverse
selection model. Razin and Sadka (2003) use an informational asymmetry to model the role of foreign direct
investments, Casella and Rauch (2002) derive a role for minority groups in international trade using an
informational friction, and McCalman (2002) considers the impact of asymmetric information in bargaining
about trade agreements. Eicher (1999) considers a model that is significantly richer than ours in many ways,
but the informational asymmetry is modeled in reduced form.
7Other models based on trust and endogenous quality reputation are Araujo and Ornelas (2007), Araujo
et al. (2016), Rasmusen (2017), and Basu and Chau (1998), who assume countries are initially asymmetric
as they differ in the endowment of human capital.
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externality interacts with local market conditions. However, there are also crucial differ-
ences: our model resorts to imperfect information rather than global increasing returns.
Agglomeration models predict a positive relation between size and development whereas
our model has no such implications, as illustrated in Section . This is because what matters
in determining a country’s reputation is the proportion, not the number of skilled workers.
We borrow some of the modeling assumptions from the statistical discrimination liter-
ature. In Moro and Norman (2004) racial differences arise in a statistical discrimination
model because groups specialize in the level of acquired skill. Here, countries take the role
of racial groups, but embedding the reputational effects in a model in which spillover effects
are carried by equilibrium price effects creates some additional complications that are ab-
sent in Moro and Norman (2004). To make the analysis more transparent we have therefore
simplified the information technology (the noisy signal has support on two realizations), the
production technology (it is linear), so complementarities arise here because of convexity
in consumer preferences only. All these simplifications can be relaxed at the cost of some
additional complexity of the analysis.
III The Model
Two countries, labeled by j = h, f, are populated by a continuum of agents, where λh and
λf = 1−λh denote the mass of agents in each country. Agents are price takers. We build on
a simple 2×2×2 trade model but with factors of production being workers with and without
human capital. The model is closed by a stylized model of human capital acquisition and an
informational technology borrowed from the statistical discrimination literature.8 Workers
cannot migrate.
All agents can invest in human capital by paying an investment cost c drawn from a
cumulative density G defined on the interval [c, c]. Investment is binary, the investment
cost c is private information and is independent of which country the agent lives in. We call
workers who invest in human capital qualified and the others unqualified. Agents have the
same preferences. The utility of an agent consuming the bundle (x1, x2) is u (x1, x2)−c if the
agent invests and u (x1, x2) otherwise, where u is a homothetic and strictly quasi-concave.
After the investments, nature assigns each worker a signal θ ∈ {g, b} that employers
observe. For simplicity we assume that
Pr [g|worker qualified] = Pr [b|worker unqualified] = η > 1
2
, (1)
8See Coate and Loury (1993)
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where the restriction that η > 1/2 labels signals so that g is good news. Our preferred
interpretation is that the unobservable investment is a costly effort decision and the signal
is an imperfect measure of the costly effort, aggregating information from letter of recom-
mendation, grades, tests, etc. . . .
The two consumption goods are produced solely from qualified and unqualified labor,
denoted q and n respectively, according to
y1 (q, n) = q; y2 (q, n) = q + n. (2)
All workers are thus perfect substitutes in industry 2, whereas only qualified workers con-
tribute to the production of good 1.9
After defining equilibrium, we show in Subsection that given human capital investment
the equilibrium in the goods and labor markets can be characterized as the solution to a
planners’ problem, simplifying the derivations that follow. Section shows how technology
can be represented graphically by a production possibilities set.
Equilibrium
Our notion of equilibrium is analogous to a competitive equilibrium in a perfect information
environment, but the informational asymmetry makes the treatment of the “labor supply”
somewhat non-standard: skilled labor is endogenously determined by incentives that depend
on prices derived from the goods markets.
Consider an agent with realized wage w deciding how to allocate her earnings between
the two goods given prices p = (p1, p2). The (ex-post) maximized utility of the worker is
v(w, p) = max
x1,x2
u (x1, x2) (3)
subject to p1x1 + p2x2 ≤ w.
By strict quasi-concavity of u (x1, x2), the optimization problem in (3) has a unique solution,
and, with the usual notational abuse, we denote the demand functions by x1(w, p), x2(w, p).
Employers cannot observe if a worker is qualified, so a labor demand is a map l :
{g, b} → R+. Denote with pi any fraction of qualified workers in a country. This fraction
can be thought of as the prior probability of a worker being qualified, before employers
observes the signal. Employers then use Bayes’ rule to form the posterior probability that
9This extreme technology is for simplicity only. In previous versions we considered a more general
technology with one good being more intensive in skilled labor than the other. This generalization creates
no additional qualitative insights. Qualitatively, we need two sectors with different factor intensities, just
like in the Hecksher-Ohlin model with fixed factor endowments.
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a worker is qualified given her signal:
µ (g, pi) ≡ ηpi
ηpi + (1− η) (1− pi) µ (b, pi) ≡
(1− η)pi
(1− η)pi + η (1− pi) . (4)
Associated with any fraction of qualified workers, pi, and a given labor demand l, the
corresponding quantities of qualified and unqualified workers are:
q = l (g)µ (g, pi) + l (b)µ (b, pi) (5)
n = l (g) (1− µ (g, pi)) + l (b) (1− µ (b, pi)) ,
We assume that a strong law of large numbers applies and treat q and n in (5) as both
expected and realized inputs of labor.
Without loss of generality there is a representative firm in each sector and each country,
which takes a wage schedule wj : {g, b} → R+ and output prices pi as given.10 Using the
production function (2) and (5), the profit maximization problem for a Sector 1 firm is
max
l
p1
(
l (g)µ
(
g, pij
)
+ l (b)µ
(
b, pij
))− wjgl (g)− wjb l (b) , (6)
For Sector 2, where qualified and unqualified workers are equally productive, the profit
maximization problem is
max
l
p2 (l (g) + l (b))− wjgl (g)− wjb l (b) . (7)
Agents have rational expectations about the wages and prices, but face uncertainty
about the realization of the signal. Denoting v (w, p) the indirect utility function defined in
(3), the expected utility for an agent in country j with investment cost c is
ηv(wjg, p) + (1− η) v(wjb , p)− c (8)
if a worker invest in human capital, and
(1− η)v(wjg, p) + ηv(wjb , p) (9)
if not. The worker is better off investing if and only if (8) exceeds (9), or if the cost of
investment is less than the gross incentives: c ≤ (2η − 1) · (v(wjg, p) -v(wjb , p)). The implied
10The caveat is that the informational asymmetry would disappear if (qualified) workers could start their
own firms. We rule this and other contractual solutions to the informational asymmetry out by assumption.
One way to justify this is to assume that there is a minimum efficient scale for production and that only
aggregate output, and not the performance of individual workers, can be observed.
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proportion of investors in country j is thus
pij = G
(
(2η − 1) (v(wjg, p)− v(wjb , p))
)
. (10)
To sum up: optimal consumption plans are defined in (3), (6) and (7) describe the profit
maximization problems for each sector, and (10) summarizes the individually optimal hu-
man capital investments.
What remains to describe are the market clearing conditions. Factor market clearing
requires that the aggregate demand for workers with each signal equals the mass of agents
who draw the signal. That is, let lji = (l
j
i (g) , l
j
i (b)) be a labor demand scheme in industry
i and country j and write the labor market clearing conditions as
lj1 (g) + l
j
2 (g) = ηpi
j + (1− η) (1− pij) (11)
lj1 (b) + l
j
2 (b) = (1− η)pij + η(1− pij).
Finally, for the product market equilibrium conditions it is convenient to let xji be the
output in industry i and country j. That is
xj1 = l
j
1 (g)µ
(
g, pij
)
+ lj1 (b)µ
(
b, pij
)
(12)
xj2 = l
j
2 (g) + l
j
2 (b) ,
which allows us to write the product market clearing conditions for the world market as
∑
j=h,f
λj
xji − [ηpij + (1− η) (1− pij)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
#agents with wage wjg
xi(w
j
g, p)−
[
(1− η)pij + η(1− pij)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
#agents with wage wjb
xi(w
j
b , p)
 = 0
(13)
Our definition of equilibrium is then:
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium consists of output prices p∗, wages wj∗, labor de-
mands lj∗i , outputs x
j∗
i , and fractions of qualified workers pi
j∗ for each country j = h, f and
industry i = 1, 2 , satisfying:
(a) lj∗1 solves (6) and l
j∗
2 solves (7) given pi = p
∗
i and x
j∗
1 and x
j∗
2 are the associated
profit maximizing outputs in j = h, f
(b) the product market clearing conditions in (13) are satisfied.
(c) the factor market clearing conditions in (11) are satisfied.
(d) pij∗ satisfies (10) given p = p∗ and wages wj = wj∗for j = h, f
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We refer to a situation where all equilibrium conditions except the optimal investment
condition (d) are fulfilled as a continuation equilibrium.11
A Planning Characterization of Continuation Equilibria
From the point of view of an informationally unconstrained planner, a continuation equi-
librium is inefficient: qualified and unqualified workers with the same signal are treated
symmetrically, resulting in a misallocation of workers to jobs. However, if the symmet-
ric treatment of workers with the same signal is viewed as a fundamental property of the
environment, then the equilibrium allocation is (constrained) efficient conditional on the in-
vestment behavior. This allows us to describe aggregate equilibrium allocations as solutions
to the planning problem:
max
(x1,x2)∈XW (pih,pif)
u (x1, x2) , (14)
where XW
(
pih, pif
)
is the world production possibilities set defined in Section .
The following proposition shows that, for fixed investments, versions of the welfare the-
orems hold: the equilibrium is characterized by a planning problem where the informational
asymmetry is built into the feasible set. This allows us to appeal to simple graphs in the
analysis that follows.
Proposition 1 Suppose that u (x1, x1) is homothetic. Then:
1. The aggregate world consumption in any continuation equilibrium is a solution to (14)
2. Suppose that (x∗1, x∗2) solves (14), (p∗1, p∗2) is a normal to a hyperplane that separates
the set of bundles such that u (x1, x2) ≥ u (x∗1, x∗2) and XW
(
pih, pif
)
, and that wj∗g =
max
{
p∗1µ
(
g, pij
)
, p∗2
}
and wj∗b = max
{
p∗1µ
(
b, pij
)
, p∗2
}
in each country j. Then these
prices, wages and aggregate consumption are part of a continuation equilibrium.12
Proposition 1 immediately implies that, given any
(
pih, pif
)
there is a unique continuation
equilibrium up to a re-normalization of the prices.
The Production Possibilities Set
A useful way to represent technology is in terms of the production possibilities set. The
set of feasible production plans in a country depends on the fraction of workers that invest
11This term is mainly due to lack of a better alternative. Due to the workers being non-atomic it does
not make a difference whether investments are made before or simultaneously with the wage posting.
12The allocation of workers in each country is somewhat complicated to describe in general, but is implicitly
pinned down as the (almost always) unique worker allocation that can produce the equilibrium bundle.
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+
+
dx2
dx1
= −piη+(1−pi)(1−η)piη
dx2
dx1
= −pi(1−η)+(1−pi)ηpi(1−η)
piη pi
pi(1− η) + (1− pi)η
x1
x2
1
Figure 1: Per capita production possibilities in a country
in human capital, pi. Figure 1 illustrates the (per capita) production possibilities set in a
country, which we denote with X (pi).
To understand the figure, first observe that (x1, x2) = (0, 1) if all workers are producing
good 2, and that (x1, x2) = (pi, 0) if all workers are producing good 1, because only a fraction
pi of the workers are productive in Sector 1. There are piη + (1− pi) (1 − η) workers with
signal g and pi (1− η) + (1− pi) η workers with signal b. If all signal g workers are in Sector
1 (piη of these workers are productive) and all signal-b workers are in Sector 2, then the
outputs are given by the point at the kink in the graph. The frontier to the right of the
kink is steeper because in that region all g workers are employed in Sector 1, therefore to
increase production firms must employ more b workers, who are less likely to be qualified.
To the left of the kink instead, only g workers are employed in Sector 1.
The world production possibilities set is given by XW
(
pih, pif
)
= λhX
(
pih
)
+ λfX
(
pif
)
and is convex by convexity of X (pi). The next proposition immediately follows, since the
production possibilities set becomes (weakly) flatter as investment in any country increases:
Proposition 2 Suppose that u (x1, x1) is homothetic. Then in any continuation equilibrium
the relative price of the high-tech good is (weakly) decreasing in the countries’ investment
pih and pif .
IV A Parametric Specification
While the results presented below are more general, for simplicity of exposition in the
remainder of the paper we will restrict attention to Cobb-Douglas preferences, u (x1, x2) =
11
xα1x
1−α
2 , which imply demand functions:
x1(p, w) =
αw
p1
x2(p, w) =
(1− α)w
p2
. (15)
The continuation utility for a worker that earns wage w is therefore:
v(w, p) =
αα(1− α)1−α
pα1 p
1−α
2
w. (16)
We normalize setting p2 = 1 and, with abuse of notation, write p (pi) , w
j
g (pi) and w
j
b (pi) for
the unique continuation equilibrium prices and wages in good 2 units, where pi =
(
pih, pif
)
.
A qualified worker earns wjg (pi) with probability η and w
j
b (pi) with probability 1 − η.
Symmetrically, an unqualified worker earns wjg (pi) with probability 1 − η and wjb (pi) with
probability η. Computing the expectation of v(w, p) in (16) conditional on investment and
subtracting from this the expectation of v(w, p) conditional on not investing we get the
gross benefits of investment for an agent in country j, denoted Bj (pi) , which is given by
Bj (pi) = E {v (w, p) |qualified} − E {v (w, p) |unqualified} (17)
= αα(1− α)1−α(2η − 1)(w
j
g (pi)− wjb (pi))
(p (pi))α
.
Using condition (d) in Definition 1 we see that any pi such that pij = G
(
Bj (pi)
)
for j = h, f
gives an equilibrium fraction of investors in each country. All that remains to calculate full
equilibria is to derive expressions for the continuation equilibrium prices.
Continuation Equilibria in Autarky
As a benchmark, we first consider a closed economy. Suppressing the country index, we write
pi for the proportion of qualified workers. There are three possible types of continuation
equilibria, illustrated in Figure 2.13
Type A equilibria (allocation of workers “according to signals”). Graphically,
this type occurs when the tangency is at the kink of the feasible set. That is, all workers
with signal b (g) are working in the low (high) tech sector. Outputs are then x1 = ηpi and
13This is a somewhat unfortunate aspect of having only 2 signals. With a continuum of signals we would
get a strictly convex production possibilities set and the tangency condition would determine a unique
threshold signal. However, as it is much simpler to compute explicit examples with two signals we decided
to stick with the more inelegant case. Calculations are straightforward but may be tedious. We provided
more detailed steps in the web appendix Moro and Norman (2017).
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Figure 2: Three types of continuation equilibria
x2 = (1− η)pi+ η (1− pi) , so the demands in (15) pin down the price of the high-tech good
as
p (pi) =
α
1− α
(1− η)pi + η (1− pi)
ηpi
. (18)
Candidate equilibrium wages are obtained by the zero profits condition. Since p2 = 1, this
immediately gives wb (pi) = 1. The high-tech firm sells ηpi units at price p (pi) and hires
ηpi + (1− η) (1− pi) workers with signal g. Zero profits in Sector 1 therefore implies that
the wage in that sector, wg(pi), equals the price of good 1 times the expected probability
that a worker with signal g is productive in that sector µ(g, pi):
wg (pi) = p (pi)µ (g, pi) = p (pi)
piη
piη + (1− η) (1− pi) , (19)
which has the alternative interpretation that the wage equals the expected value of output.
Finally, we have to check that a high-tech firm has no incentive to hire signal b workers, and
that a low-tech firm has no incentive to hire signal g workers. These conditions give rise to
inequalities that determine the region where a Type A equilibrium exists (see Figure 3).
Type B equilibria (mixing of good signals). In Figure 2, this corresponds to a tan-
gency to the left of the kink. Some workers with signal g work in Sector 2. These workers
earn the same wage as g-signal workers in Sector 1, and, since all workers in the low-tech
sector are paid their marginal product, 1, it follows immediately that wg (pi) = wb (pi) = 1.
This provides workers zero incentives to invest. Because this makes the case less interesting
for the full equilibrium of the model we refer the reader to the web appendix for details.
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Figure 3: Types of autarky equilibria in the (α, η) space
Type C equilibria (mixing of bad signals). This equilibrium occurs when the demand
for the high-tech good is strong (i.e. when the Cobb-Douglas share of good 1 parameter α
is high). In Figure 2, this corresponds to a tangency to the right of the kink. In this case a
fraction β of workers with signal b (defined below) works in Sector 1. Workers with signal
b employed in the low-tech sector are paid 1. Signal-b workers in the high tech sector must
be paid their expected productivity, which equals the price times their probability of being
productive, or p(pi)·µ(b, pi). But since b-signal workers must be paid the same wage in both
sectors, wb (pi) = p(pi)·µ(b, pi) = 1 we can pin down the price of good 1 as the inverse of the
probability that a bad signal worker is productive in the high-tech sector,
p(pi) =
1
µ(b, pi)
=
pi(1− η) + (1− pi)η
pi(1− η) (20)
The price must also satisfy a relationship imposed by demand shares (15):
p (pi) =
α
1− α
x2 produced by b-workers︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− β) ((1− η)pi + η (1− pi))
ηpi︸︷︷︸
x1produced by g workers
+ β(1− η)pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
x1produced by b workers
(21)
Equating the right-hand sides of (20) and (21) determines the fraction of b-signal workers
employed in Sector 1, β. The solution reveals that a positive β exists if and only if α > η,
as illustrated in Figure 3. We refer the reader again to the web appendix for details.
Equilibrium investments in Autarky
To obtain a closed form expression for the incentives to invest as a function of pi substitute
the wages and prices derived in Section into (17). If α ≤ η, this function may be written
14
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Figure 4: Gross incentives to invest under autarky
as:14
B (pi) = max
{
(2η − 1)
(
piη
pi(1− η) + (1− pi) η
)α(α− (piη + (1− pi)(1− η))
piη + (1− pi)(1− η)
)
, 0
}
. (22)
Figure 4 plots B (pi) for two sets of parameter values. All values where B(pi) > 0 in the
figure correspond to type-A continuation equilibria, where g workers produce good 1 and
b workers produce good 2. B (pi) is single-peaked, but not necessarily concave (example in
the right panel). Under different specifications of information and output technology the
single-peakedness may break down, but what remains true is that the function is equal to
zero at the extremes, and therefore must be initially increasing, and eventually decreasing.
The reason is that if pi = 0 or pi = 1 workers are all equally productive in the production
of both goods regardless of their signal (in particular, they are all unproductive in Sector
1 when pi = 0), therefore their wage does not depend on the signal. But if better signals
are not rewarded with higher wages, incentives to invest are zero. Only when 0 < pi < 1
the signal carries information; workers that receive a good signal are paid higher wages,
generating positive incentives to invest.
Any pi such that pi = G (B (pi)) is an equilibrium fraction of investors. Since G (B (pi)) is
continuous and takes values on [0, 1], existence follows trivially. The fixed point condition
is illustrated in Figure 5, computed with η = 2/3, α = 1/2 and G uniform over [c, c], with
c − c = 0.2. Changes in c correspond to shifts in the cost distribution. If c < 0 (i.e. when
some workers prefer to invest even without incentives) the equilibrium is unique. For c = 0,
there is a trivial equilibrium with no investment and an equilibrium with pi > 0. As c gets
slightly larger there are three equilibria (one with pi = 0), whereas if c is sufficiently large
(not shown in the figure), as the curve shifts to the right only the trivial equilibrium with
no investment remains.
14See the web appendix for a detailed derivation.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium fixed point maps for two values of c, with η = 2/3, α = 1/2
In the next section we derive equilibria with two countries that trade. In many examples
we will assume that a unique equilibrium with pi > 0 exists under autarky.15 This is to
highlight that country specialization does not rely on multiplicity of equilibria, that is, on
countries coordinating on different equilibria of the autarkic model (with multiplicity under
autarky, further possibilities for specialization with trade arise). This assumption also
eliminates “nuisance equilibria” with zero investments and makes welfare analysis sharper,
not having to rely on comparisons between sets of equilibria.
V Equilibria in the Trade Regime
In this section we assume that h and f trade on a frictionless world market. We will first
prove by construction the main result of the paper: the existence of a asymmetric equilibria
with trade and specialization. Next, we provide some evidence of the generality of the result
and show that trade equilibria exist even when there is a unique equilibrium without trade.
While the replication of the autarky equilibrium in both countries remains an equilibrium of
the two-country model (with no trade), we will show in the next section that this equilibrium
may be unstable. We will conclude the analysis illustrating some welfare properties of the
equilibria with trade.
15Sufficient conditions are that G ◦ B is concave and c < 0. The first is a technical assumption needed
to ensure that G() does not intersect the 45 degree line from below. The second assumption posits that an
arbitrarily small fraction of workers like to make the investment even if there are no monetary gains. We do
not believe this to be unrealistic.
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Illustration of the existence of asymmetric equilibria by construction
The simplest asymmetric equilibrium we can construct occurs when the poor country, which
we label as country h, is fully specialized in the low-tech sector. In such an equilibrium, the
wage gap in h is zero, so the fraction of qualified workers in h is pinned down as pih = G (0) .
Then, the proportion of qualified workers in f solves a single variable fixed point equation
similarly to the autarky case, but with some extra production of x2 performed in country
h. Once pif is obtained from this condition, it only remains to check that firms in h have
no incentives to hire workers with signal g to produce the high-tech good.
To formalize the argument, assume G = U [0, 0.2]. Assuming all workers in country h
specialize in the production of x2, this induces zero incentives to invest, implying pi
h =
G(0) = 0 and no incentives to place any worker in Sector 1 in country h. There is always a
trivial equilibrium with pif = 0, zero production of good 1, and zero utility for all, but we
look for non-trivial equilibria with positive incentives to invest in f. If these equilibria exist,
the equilibrium in country f is of type A or C (a fraction 0 < β ≤ 1 of bad signal workers
producing good 1).16 The relative price of good 1 is pinned down by conditions similar to
the autarky case, but modified to take into account the production of good 2 occurring in
country h. The equivalent of (21) is:17
p
(
pif
)
=
α
1− α
x2 produced in f︷ ︸︸ ︷
λf
(
(1− β) (1− η)pif + η
(
1− pif
))
+
x2 in h︷︸︸︷
λh
λf
(
ηpif + β(1− η)pif
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
x1 produced in f
(23)
Where β = 0 if the equilibrium is of type A (no workers with signal b produce good 1) and
0 < β < 1 if the equilibrium is of type C (some b-signal workers produce good 1). In a type-
A equilibrium this equation defines the relative price of good 1, whereas if the equilibrium of
type C, this equation defines β: because b workers are employed in both sectors, the price is
determined by equalizing their marginal productivity in the two sectors: p(pif )µ
(
b, pif
)
= 1.
To derive incentives to invest, we now make two additional assumptions that do not
hinder the generality of the result, as we discuss below, but simplify the derivations: we
set equal Cobb-Douglas shares α = 1/2, information technology parameter η = 2/3, and
equal country sizes: λh = λf = 1/2. It is possible to show after simple but tedious algebraic
simplifications, which we relegate to the web appendix, that the continuation equilibrium in
16In equilibria of type B (mixing of good signals) some good signal workers produce good 2 and therefore
receive wage 1, which is the same as the wage of bad signal workers. This provides no incentives to invest
leading to the uninteresting equilibrium (pih, pif ) = (0, 0).
17Since we are looking for equilibria where pih = 0 we can drop the dependency of the price on pih.
17
country f is of type C. Workers with signal b in f are employed in both sectors, therefore the
price is pinned down by equating the marginal product of these workers in the two sectors
1 = p(pif )µ(b, pif ), which, using (4), and η = 2/3 implies p(pif ) =
(
2− pif) /pif . Wages are:
wfb = 1, w
f
g = p(pi
f )µ(g, pif ) =
2− pif
pif
2pif
1 + pif
.
Solving (23) for β, the fraction of b-signal workers in country f employed in Sector 1 is
β = (1 + pif )/(4− 2pif ). We are now in a position to derive incentives to invest in country
f. We substitute our derivations into (17) to obtain,
Bf (pif ) =
1
6
(√
p (pif )µ
(
g, pif
)
− 1√
p (pif )
)
=
(
4− 2pif
1 + pif
− 1
)√
pif
2− pif , (24)
with µ (g, pi) = 2pi/(1 + pi) from (4). Note that (24) is equal to zero for pif = 0 or 1. The
equilibrium in country f is defined by the fixed-point equation pif = G
(
Bf
(
pif
))
with one
interior solution at pif = 0.49 with p = 3.095. As will be shown next, this type of trade
equilibrium is robust to perturbations of the parametric assumptions we made.
Robustness of the equilibria with trade
The cost distribution. We explore first how shifts in the cost distribution affect the
existence of asymmetric equilibria of the type we computed in the previous subsection (full
specialization of h country workers). We assume a uniform G over [c, c+ 0.2], and treat the
lower bound of the distribution c as a variable, holding the other parameters fixed.
Figure 6 illustrates the results. The solid line represents equilibrium investments in
country f if there were no incentives to invest in country h. The dotted line is the fraction
that is willing to invest without incentives, and the line in between represents equilibrium
investments in autarky. It cannot be seen in the figure, but it can be shown that pih =
G (B (0)) is a best response given that the country f invests in accordance with the solid
line, so country h investing in accordance with the dotted line and f in accordance with
the solid line is an equilibrium under trade.
Both curves bend backwards, so there is a range with multiple equilibria in the autarky
model (see dashed line where c > 0). If c > 0 zero incentives in county h implies pih = 0.
As can be seen from the solid line bending backwards in this region, there are three best
responses in country f to pih = 0: one is the trivial equilbrium pif = 0 whereas two have
positive investment. There is also a range to the right of approximately c = 0.023 where
there are two non-trivial asymmetric trade equilibria, despite the unique autarky equilibrium
18
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Figure 6: Equilibrium investments under trade with η = 2/3, α = 1/2 for different values
of c.
being a trivial zero investment equilibrium (the dashed line can’t be seen but it corresponds
to the horizontal axis in this range). For example if c = 0.05, pif = {0, 0.03, 0.31} are all
best responses to pih = 0.
Multiple autarky equilibria are not necessary for trade to occur. For c approximately
between -0.07 and 0 there is an asymmetric equilibrium with trade, and a unique autarky
equilibrium. To illustrate one such equilibria, when c = −0.05, 25 percent of workers from
country h are willing to invest even when there are no incentives to do so. Assuming that
this is the case, and placing all workers of country h in Sector 2, in country f most workers
specialize in Sector 1, generating incentives so that pif = 0.63 is the optimal response,
with a relative price of good 1 equal to 2.16. It remains to be checked is that there are
no incentives to employ country h workers with good signals in Sector 1. With pih = .25,
the expected probability of being qualified for a good worker is µ(g, 0.25) = 0.4, which
multiplied by the price 2.16 gives an expected productivity of 0.865, less than the unit
productivity in Sector 2. In general, one can verify that this condition, p(pif )η(g, pih) ≤ 1,
is satisfied if 4pi
h
1+3pih
≤ pif , which holds as long as pih = G(0) is small enough. Indeed for
lower values of the lower bound of the cost distribution not displayed in the figure, as the
number of qualified workers in country h increases, it becomes impossible to sustain this
type of asymmetric equilibrium.
Country size and preference parameter. Existence of this type of trade equilibria
also does not hinge on our choice of the values of relative country size λh and of the
Cobb-Douglas preference parameter α. Figure 7 shows the production possibilities frontier
when all workers in country h produce good 2. An increase in λh shifts the production
possibilities frontier from the solid to the dashed line, but does not change the slope of
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Figure 7: World production possibilities frontier when all in h produce good 2
the frontier in correspondence to a type-C equilibrium, because the relative productivity of
workers in country f in the two sectors, determined by the information technology, does
not change. Similarly, a change in α changes the slope of the indifference curves. Therefore,
perturbations of α and λh (small enough so that the equilibrium remains of type C in
countryf) change the point of tangency but not the equilibrium price, which is defined
by the slope of the production possibilities set.18 Expected productivities, determined by
the price and the information technology, do not change, therefore wages do not change.
Incentives and equilibrium investment remain the same in both countries.
Extreme specialization in country h. Asymmetric equilibria also do not depend on
the extreme specialization in country h we assumed to construct the equilibrium of the
previous subsection. The analysis gets more complicated because when positive incentives
to invest exist in both countries, solving for equilibrium implies computing the solution
to a system of two fixed-point equations. For an intuition, recall from Proposition 2 that
the equilibrium price is decreasing in pif (strictly, in some regions). From (17), incentives
are increasing in price because price increases wages of g-signal workers more than wages of
b-signal workers.19 Hence, an increase in investments abroad decreases prices and incentives
at home. Symmetrically, an increase in investments at home reduces incentives abroad. In
18Prices are constant because of the simplifying assumption that information technology has only two
signals available. With a more general information structure the production possibilities set would be
strictly convex, and small perturbations of λh or α would have a small effect on equilibrium prices. To make
the case that a nearby trade equilibrium still exists we would have to rely on continuity arguments.
19Either b workers are employed only in Sector 2, in which case their wage is fixed at 1, or some are
employed in Sector 1, in which case their wage is p(pi)µ(b, pij) which is less than the wage of g-signal workers
employed in Sector 1, p(pi)µ(g, pij).
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reduced form, this is like a negative cross-country externality in human capital acquisition.
These effects create equilibria where countries specialize: rich countries export the high-tech
good and poor countries export the low-tech good, even when the autarky equilibrium is
unique.
Formally, consider the region of the parameter space where equiilbria are of type C or A
in both countries,20 so that wjg = p(pi)µ(g, pij) and w
j
b = 1. Differentiate (17) with respect to
the two countries’ investment to obtain, using p as shorthand for p(pih, pif ) and introducing
notation Ψ = (2η − 1)αα(1− α)1−α:
∂Bf
(
pih, pif
)
∂pif
= Ψp1−α
dµ(g, pif )
dpif︸ ︷︷ ︸
“information effect”
+ Ψp−α
(
(1− α)µ(g, pif ) + α
p
)
∂p
∂pif︸ ︷︷ ︸
“price effect”
(25)
∂Bh
(
pih, pif
)
∂pif
= Ψp−α
(
(1− α)µ(g, pif ) + α
p
)
∂p
∂pif︸ ︷︷ ︸
“price effect”
(26)
The price effect labeled in the equations is, as discussed, negative, and occurs in both coun-
tries whereas the information effect bites only in the country where investment changes.
The information effect is positive because as the proportion of investors increases, the prob-
ability that an individual with good signal is productive increases as well, but its size
depends on the size of pif . Hence, starting from a non-trivial autarky equilibrium in which
piA = pif = pih, an increase in pif either decreases function Bh and increases Bf , or it shifts
Bh downwards more than it shifts Bf . A decrease in pih has the symmetrically opposite
effect. These derivations illustrate why the informational externality pushes countries to
specialize. One can then find values pih < pif such that Bh(pih, pif ) < Bf (pih, pif ). Whether
these values satisfy the equilibrium conditions depends on the cost distribution, but exam-
ples can be constructed to this end.21
20This is necessary to have strictly positive incentives to invest in both countries
21If one is willing to let the parameters of G be free, note for the sake of constructing a trade equilibrium
that there is an infinite number of probability distributions satisfying the three restrictions on their domain
that are needed for (pih, pif ) to hold as a trade equilibrium together with piA as an autarky equilibrium:
G(Bh(pih, pif )) = pih, G(Bf (pih, pif )) = pif , and G(B(piA, piA)) = piA.
21
VI Stability, Welfare, and the Irrelevance of Size
Stability
A symmetric equilibrium replicating autarky always exists in the trade regime. However,
this equilibrium can be unstable when the economy is open for trade.22
Consider a parameterization where piA is a stable autarky equilibrium.23 It follows that
pi =
(
piA, piA
)
is an equilibrium when the countries are allowed to trade.
We want to analyze the effects of small deviations from the symmetric equilibrium.
Consider the change in relative price first. When pih = pif = pi and assuming again η = 2/3
and α = 1/2, we are in the region where η ≥ α. The autarky equilibrium must be of type
A. One can derive that when the equilibrium is of type A in both countries, the price is
equal to p(pih, pif ) = (4− pih − pif )/2(pih + pif ),24 therefore p (pi, pi) = (2− pi) /2pi, which is
consistent with (18). Differentiating these expression gives:
d
dpi
p(pi, pi) =
−1
(pi)2
(relevant under autarky) (27)
∂
∂pif
p(pih, pif ) =
−2
(pih + pif )
2 (relevant with trade).
Evaluating each expression at (piA, piA) we have that
d
dpi
p(pi, pi)
∣∣∣∣
pi=piA
− ∂p(pi
h, pif )
∂pif
∣∣∣∣
pih=pif=piA
=
−1
(piA)2
− −2
4 (piA)2
=
−1
2 (piA)2
< 0 . (28)
An increase in investments thus has a larger negative impact on the price in autarky, as
intuition suggests. Autarky is equivalent to the trade regime with the added restriction that
pih = pif = pi. We compare the effect of a change in investment on incentives to invest (17)
between the regimes. In the autarky case, we restrict the two arguments of Bf to be equal,
while the second argument is unrestricted in the open economy case. With α = 1/2 and
η = 2/3, the derivative of the incentives function (25) further simplifies to obtain (using pA
22Because the model lacks real time, “stability” is a somewhat ad hoc criterion that corresponds to the
adjustment dynamic where pijt+1 = G(B
j(pijt , pi
k
t )), j, k = h, f, j 6= k (or the natural continuous analogue).
Embedding the model in an OLG framework one obtains such dynamic system if one assumes that employers
can not differentiate between workers of different cohorts.
23For example, when c < 0, we know there is a unique autarky equilibrium, which must be stable since
G(B(pi)) must intersect the 45o line from above.
24See the web appendix for the detailed derivation.
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Figure 8: Best responses under trade and autarky, at the autarky equilibrium
as shorthand notation for p(piA, piA)) :
dBj (pi, pi)
dpi
∣∣∣∣
pi=piA
=
√
pA
6
dµ (g, pi)
dpi
∣∣∣∣∣
pi=piA︸ ︷︷ ︸
“information effect”
+
1
12
√
pA
(
µ
(
g, piA
)
+
1
pA
)
dp(pi, pi)
dpi
∣∣∣∣
pi=piA︸ ︷︷ ︸
“price effect”
(29)
∂Bf
(
pih, pif
)
∂pif
∣∣∣∣∣
pih=piA
pif=piA
=
√
pA
6
dµ
(
g, pif
)
dpif
∣∣∣∣∣
pif=piA︸ ︷︷ ︸
“information effect”
+
1
12
√
pA
(
µ
(
g, piA
)
+
1
pA
)
∂p(pih, pif )
∂pif
∣∣∣∣
pih=piA
pif=piA︸ ︷︷ ︸
“price effect”
,
(30)
In each case, the effect on incentives is decomposed as a positive “information effect” and a
negative “price effect”. The information effect in (29) is the same as in (30), but, by (28),
the price effect is stronger in autarky, so the slope of Bf
(
pif , pih = piA
)
exceeds the slope
of the autarky benefits of investment B (pi) , when evaluating both functions at piA (see
Figure 8). Hence, it is possible that G(Bf
(
pif , pih = piA
)
) intersects the 45o line from below
at pif = piA even if G (B(pi)) intersects from above. Since the curve G(Bf
(
pif , pih = piA
)
)
intersecting the 45o line from below is a sufficient condition for local instability this shows
that the autarky equilibrium may be destabilized by opening up for trade.25
Next, we illustrate some welfare properties of the equilibria with trade.
25Examples are easy to find. When c is uniformly distributed on [0, 2] , the unique (non-trivial) autarky
equilibrium is pi = .0067. The equilibrium where pif = pih = 0.067 is unstable under trade, while an
asymmetric equilibrium with pif = .0283, pih = 0 is stable.
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η = 2
3
, α = 1
2
, c ∼ U [−0.02, 0.18] Trade, Country h Trade, Country f Autarky
Equilibrium Investment pih = 0.1 pif = 0.548 pi = .269
Per Capita Production
yh1 = 0
yh2 = 1
yf1 = 0.463
yf2 = 0.226
y1 = 0.179
y2 = 0.577
Per Capita Consumption
xh1 = 0.189
xh2 = 0.5
xf1 = 0.274
xf2 = 0.726
x1 = y1
x2 = y2
Gross incentives to invest Bh(pih, pif ) = 0 Bf (pih, pif ) = 0.090 B(pi, pi) = 0.034
Gross expected utility 0.307 0.446 0.321
Expected utility net of inv. cost 0.308 0.427 0.319
Expected utility if invest 0.307− c 0.487− c 0.346− c
Expected utility if don’t invest 0.307 0.397 0.313
Wages
whg = 1
whb = 1
wfg = 1.875
wfb = 1
wg = 1.364
wb = 1
Expected Wage 1 1.452 1.154
Prices p1 = 2.648 p1 = 3.216
Table 1: Trade and autarky equilibria in Example 1
Example 1: specialization may be beneficial only to the rich country
Table 1 displays a parameterization where all country f citizens are better off in the asym-
metric trade equilibrium than in the unique autarky equilibrium, and where all country h
citizens are worse off in the asymmetric trade equilibrium than under autarky.26
Notice that the total world output of both goods is higher in the asymmetric equilibrium
(see the second row of the table). While prohibitive trade barriers would make country h
better off, it is also true that there exists transfer payments from f to h that can make both
countries better off relative to the autarky equilibrium. Hence there are some productive
gains from specialization despite the countries being fundamentally identical.
Example 2: specialization may make both countries better off
In this example trade makes both countries better off. For maximal simplicity we rig this
example so that the “free rider problem” in human capital investments is so severe that
the unique equilibrium under autarky is the trivial equilibrium. However, with trade, the
existence of the other country means that, for any investment pif in country f, the price of
good 1 is higher than without trade if there is no human capital investment in country h.
Hence, trade allows a new market to emerge that would not operate without trade.
In Table 2 we summarize one example where the market for good 1 only operates with
26Although some agents change their investment behavior in the comparison across equilibria, this does
not complicate Pareto comparisons. The crucial fact is that (in the example) both qualified and unqualified
workers gain (lose) in country f (h). All workers in the rich country have the option to invest as in the
autarky equilibrium, so revealed preferences imply that all workers gain. Similarly, in the poor country
all workers have the option to invest as in the trade equilibrium when in autarky, so again, by revealed
preferences, all workers are better off in autarky.
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η = 2
3
, α = 1
2
, c ∼ U [.04, .24] Trade, Country h Trade, Country f Autarky
Equilibrium Investment pih = 0 pif = 0.353 pi = 0
Production
yh1 = 0
yh2 = 1
yf1 = 0.284
yf2 = 0.323
y1 = 0
y2 = 1
Consumption
xh1 = 0.107
xh2 = 0.5
xf1 = 0.177
xf2 = 0.823
x1 = y1
x2 = y2
Gross incentives to invest Bh(pih, pif ) = 0 Bf (pih, pif ) = 0.111 B(pi, pi) = 0
Gross average utility 0.232 0.381 0
Avg. utility net of inv. cost 0.232 0.355 0
Expected utility if invest 0.232− c 0.452− c 0− c
Expected utility if don’t invest 0.232 0.342 0
Wages
whg = 1
whb = 1
wfg = 2.433
whb = 1
wg = −
wb = 1
Expected Wage 1 1.647 1
Prices p1 = 4.660 p1 = −
Table 2: Trade and autarky equilibria in Example 2
international trade. There are multiple trade equilibria and the numbers in the table refer
to the equilibrium with the largest fraction of investors in the country producing good 1.27
Consumers are happier when consuming both goods than when consuming only one
good. Because a new market opens up, trade is beneficial for both countries.
Pareto Improving Inequality
The example presented above is extreme, but specialization through trade may more gen-
erally be viewed as an imperfect “solution” to the informational problem in the model.28
In the example, there is no way for a market to open unless the rewards for getting into the
market are large enough. These rewards are bigger if only one country enters the market:
the same “kick” from the local informational externality is generated at a smaller negative
price effect. Specialization thus reduces the problem of under investment in human capital.
Even in less extreme cases, both countries may gain from specializing: it is always true
that the production possibilities set expands when moving from a situation where both
countries invest at the same rate to an asymmetric investment profile for a constant total
quantity of investors in the world. Figure 9, assumes countries of equal size. In the left
panel, the dashed line represents the frontier some symmetric investment profile with both
countries investing at pi, whereas the continous lines (with kinks at B and C) illustrate the
frontiers in each country at an asymmetric investment profile, but with the same aggregate
investment.
On the right panel the continuous line (with kinks at D,A and E) represents the world
27There is also an equilibrium with pih = 0, pif = 0.0157. Unlike the equilibrium in Table 2 this is unstable.
28For a detailed elaboration on this point in the context of discrimination, see Norman (2003).
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Figure 9: Specialization expands the world production possibilities
production possibilities frontier under the same asymmetric investment profile assumed in
the left panel. The dashed line reproduces the dashed line from the left panel. The total
number of investors in the world is unchanged, but the world production possibilities set
is nevertheless larger when countries specialize. To understand this, note that the efficient
way of increasing x1 starting from the vertical intercept is to first only use workers from
the country with investments pi + k with good signals, so initially the slope of the world
production possibilities set must be the same as the set to the left with kink at C. The graph
is drawn for the case where it is better to use high-signal workers from the low investment
country than low signal workers from the high investment country in Sector 1, but the result
is fully general.
The Irrelevance of Size
Because this is a general equilibrium model with large countries, changes of the relative size
of the countries will in general affect the asymmetric equilibria due to price effects. The
nature of such changes depends on the parameterization.
To illustrate that size does not confer special advantage as it does in agglomeration
models, we construct examples showing that scale effects may go either way. One way
is to look at the extreme case where λh is near zero (see Appendix for details on the
computation). In this case the foreign (big) country operates as in autarky. In the (small)
home country instead, price effects are absent, because world price is only determined by
investment in the the foreign country. The examples are computed by setting λh = 1
Figure 10 panel (A) was computed using parameters α = 1/2, η = .97, c = −0.005,
c = .095 to illustrate one case where only the big country can be rich. There is a unique
symmetric equilibrium at piA = 0.48. Note that at the autarky equilibrium, incentives to
invest in human capital are decreasing in pi in the large country. In the small country instead,
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Figure 10: Equilibrium fixed point maps: large (solid line) and small (dashed line) country
additional investment does not have adverse price effects, and incentives BO increase with
pi, but not at a fast enough rate: the best response for the small country G(BO(pi, p = pA))
intersects the 450 line only below piA. Therefore there are two asymmetric equilibria where
the big country invests at pih = piA = 0.48 and the small country at pif = 0.05 or 0.29, both
less than piA.
In the example of Figure 10 panel (B) instead, the small country can be either richer or
poorer than the big country. The figure was computed with the parameters as in Numerical
Example 1 (except for country sizes). Workers’ investment in the small country is more
responsive than in the previous example at the autarky equilibrium, where the best response
intersects the 450 line from below. Both
(
pih, pif
)
= (.27, 0.1) and
(
pih, pif
)
= (.27, 0.59) are
equilibria. Note that the responsiveness of the best-response function to higher investment,
which determines the location of the fixed points for the small country above and below
piA also depends on the shape of cost of investment distribution, therefore, by changing the
shape of the cost distribution one can easily construct examples where differences between
countries are large or small regardless of country size.
Finally, when the unique autarky equilibrium is at piA = 0, if the large country is large
enough only the small country can be richer. For example, if the example in Section is
extended to allow for different country sizes, there is a critical size such that the country
must fully specialize in the low-tech industry if it exceeds this critical size. Reducing the
size of the country from 1/2 on the other hand only improves incentives. Hence, there are
circumstances where the only asymmetric equilibrium is that the small country becomes
rich.
Taken together, these examples show that there may be scale effects in favor of either
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the larger or the smaller economy, and that sometimes the equilibrium selection matters.
However, these are not really “country-scale-effects”. Instead, we prefer to think of them as
scale effects that depend on relative size of the North to the South. To understand, suppose
that there are n countries indexed by j ∈ {1, ..., n} , of size λj . Consider an equilibrium in
this model where the set of countries is partitioned into the sets P and R and where pij = pip
for all j ∈ P and pij = pir for all j ∈ R. Finally let λp = ∑j∈P λj and λr = ∑j∈R λj . This
is an equilibrium if and only if (pip, pir) is an equilibrium in the two-country model with
countries of sizes (λp, λr). There may of course be other equilibria as well, but at least for
this form of equilibrium the size of the individual country is irrelevant and the relevant scale
effect can be interpreted in our preferred manner.
A “development miracle” can be interpreted as a country that manages to re-coordinate
from being part of the developing world to being part of the developed world. The model
cannot explain how such a re-coordination is achieved, but, if the economy is small, the
effects on the rest of the world are negligible. In contrast, a simultaneous re-coordination
of a significant fraction of the “South” may lead to large enough relative price changes so
that it is not worth the while as long as there is no change in the “North”. Obviously, the
model is too stylized for policy recommendations, but this nevertheless suggests that it may
be misguided to use a few small successful countries as a model for all developing countries.
VII Concluding Remarks
This paper shows that it is possible to generate endogenous comparative advantages between
identical countries in an essentially neoclassical model. Specialization and trade arise due to
an informational externality: workers are better informed than firms about their abilities.
Two-country model equilibria can be reinterpreted as n-country model equilibria where
countries cluster in two groups in terms of level of development. Equilibria of the n-country
model are neutral with respect to the size of individual countries, so the model is consistent
with a world with no particular relationship between size and the level of development.
A natural extension is to introduce physical capital into the production technology.
This would be interesting for analyzing the role of foreign capital and capital flight from
poor countries. As this paper focuses on the effects asymmetric information about skills
we have chosen to ignore physical capital. However, if capital and human capital were
complementary in production, the effects analyzed in this paper would be reinforced.
To understand, suppose initially that capital cannot flow between countries. Except
for a capital market equilibrium condition the model is more or less the same as the one
without capital. Consider an asymmetric equilibrium under the assumption that initial
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capital endowments are identical. As capital is more useful in the high-tech industry the
return on capital is higher in the rich country, so, with free capital mobility, the rich country
must have a higher per capita level of capital. Notice that the movement of capital from
the poor to the rich country affects incentives to invest positively in the rich country and
negatively in the poor country, strengthening the incentives to specialize.29
Because this is a static model, we do not analyze workers’ incentives to migrate. Workers
with good signals in poor countries may find it advantageous to migrate where their skills
receive better rewards. However, such incentives are mitigated if employers recognize the
workers’ country of origin. When a foreign country employer forms beliefs about a home
country worker’s productivity, she may take into account the worker’s nationality, therefore
the expected productivity computed by foreign and home country employers is the same.
In this case, incentives to acquire human capital are defined by citizenship, not residence.30
A Appendix
Proof of proposition 1.
(Part 1) Consider an arbitrary equilibrium. Let x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2) denote the world produc-
tion, where x∗i = λ
hxh∗i + λ
fxf∗i and x
j∗
i denotes the production of good i in country
j in equilibrium. Also let lj∗i (θ) denote the corresponding input of workers with sig-
nal g in economy j and sector i. By profit maximization p∗ix
j∗
i −
∑
θ∈g,bw
j∗
θ l
j∗
i (θ) ≥
p∗ix
j′
i −
∑
θ∈g,bw
j∗
θ l
j′
i (θ) for any alternative plan (x
j′
i , l
j′
i (·)). Adding over the two sec-
tors and imposing the market clearing conditions on the labor market we conclude that∑
i=1,2 p
∗
ix
j∗
i − wj∗g
(
ηpij + (1− η) (1− pij))− wj∗b ((1− η)pij + η(1− pij)) ≥∑i=1,2 p∗ixj′i −
wj∗g
(
lj1 (g) + l
j
2 (g)
)
−wj∗b
(
lj1 (b) + l
j
2 (b)
)
for all possible alternative production plans (fea-
sible as well as non-feasible in the aggregate). Now for any feasible alternative allocation
lj1 (g) + l
j
2 (g) ≤ ηpij + (1− η) (1− pij) and lj1 (b) + lj2 (b) ≤ (1− η)pij + η(1− pij), implying
that
∑
i=1,2 p
∗
ix
j∗
i ≥
∑
i=1,2 p
∗
ix
j′
i for any feasible alternative (x
j′
1 , x
j′
2 ). Since this must hold
in each country we conclude that p∗x∗ ≥ p∗x′ for any alternative feasible world production
vector x′ = (x′1, x′2) . Moreover, in order for (x
j∗
1 , x
j∗
2 ) to be profit maximizing it must be
that
∑
i=1,2 p
∗
ix
j∗
i −wj∗g
(
ηpij + (1− η) (1− pij))+wj∗b ((1− η)pij + η(1− pij)) = 0. Finally,
since u is homothetic it follows from standard arguments that if (xj∗1 (w) , x
j∗
2 (w)) solves
the utility maximization problem for a worker with income w , then (w
′
w x
j∗
1 (w) ,
w′
w x
j∗
2 (w))
29Details are available on request from the authors.
30However, employers may also condition their beliefs on migration status, which is as easily recognizable
as citizenship. This raises the possibility that migrants acquire a reputation for higher investment than their
fellow citizens who did not migrate, and that this belief is confirmed in equilibrium.
29
solves the utility maximization problem for a worker with income w′. Consider the program
max
x1,x2
u (x1, x2) (A1)
s.t p∗1x1 + p
∗
2x2 ≤ p∗1x∗1 + p∗2x∗2 = p∗1
∑
j=h,f
λjxj∗1 + p
∗
2
∑
j=h,f
λjxj∗2 ,
where the star-superscript refers to equilibrium variables. The aggregate consumption bun-
dle of any equilibrium must be a solution to (A1) because the problem gets the relative
consumptions of x1 and x2 right and that p
∗
1x
∗
1 + p
∗
2x
∗
2 is the aggregate world income. We
thus conclude that if x∗ is an equilibrium world consumption plan it must solve (A1). Since
the set XW
(
pih, pif
)
is contained in the “budget set” of representative and x∗ ∈ XW (pih, pif)
it follows that x∗ must be a solution to (14).
(Part 2) Let x∗ solve (14) and let V =
{
x ∈ R2+|u (x) > u (x∗)
}
. Quasi-concavity implies
that V is a convex set. The set XW
(
pih, pif
)
is also convex (see Page 11). Moreover,
V ∩XW (pih, pif) = ∅, so the separating hyperplane theorem (Theorem 11.3. in Rockafellar
(1997)) implies that there exists some p∗ such that p∗x ≥ p∗x∗ for all x ∈ V and p∗x ≤ p∗x∗
for every x ∈ XW (pih, pif) . Let the wages be given by wj∗g = max{p∗1µ (g, pij) , p∗2} and
wj∗b = max
{
p∗1µ
(
b, pij
)
, p∗2
}
, and let the allocation of workers be as in the planning solution.
Observe in particular that if p∗1µ
(
θ, pij
)
> p∗2, then no worker with signal θ is employed in
Sector 2 in the allocation that produces x∗. This is most easily seen in the differentiable
case, where the optimality condition to (14) implies that ∂u(x
∗)
∂x∗1
/∂u(x
∗)
∂x∗2
=
p∗1
p∗2
> 1
µ(g,pij)
.
But, 1
µ(θ,pij)
is the cost of producing an extra unit of good 1 by giving up some country
j workers with good signal currently in production of good 2, so we conclude that as if
representative consumer would be better off if some of these workers would be switched to
the production of good 1, contradicting optimality of x∗ if p∗1µ
(
θ, pij
)
> p∗2 and some of the
j workers are assigned to Sector 2. A symmetric argument holds for when the inequality
is reversed. Hence, if l∗j1 (θ) > 0, then p
∗
1µ
(
θ, pij
)
= max
{
p∗1µ
(
θ, pij
)
, p∗2
}
= wj∗θ , implying
that the profit from hiring any quantity workers with signal θ is zero in Sector 1, whereas
if l∗j1 (θ) = 0, then p
∗
1µ
(
θ, pij
) ≤ max{p∗1µ (θ, pij) , p∗2} = wj∗θ , so no gain can be earned
from hiring a positive quantity. The argument for Sector 2 is symmetric, which leads us to
conclude that the outputs and (implicit) allocation of workers in the solution to (14) are
consistent with profit maximizing behavior given the prices and wages constructed.
Equilibria when One Country is a Small Open Economy
Equilibria can be calculated by solving two separate (different) one-dimensional fixed point
problems. Consider the incentives to invest in a country with fraction of investors pi
30
under the “small open economy” assumption that the price (of good 1) is fixed at p.
Equilibrium wages in the small open economy are determined to generate zero profits:
wOg = max {pµ (g, pi) , 1} and wOb = max {pµ (b, pi) , 1}. The incentive to invest in the small
open economy, denoted BO (pi; p) , is thus (using (17)),
BO (pi; p) =
(2η − 1)αα(1− α)1−α
pα
max {max{pµ (g, pi) , 1} −max {pµ (b, pi) , 1} , 0} . (A2)
If pA is well defined (i.e., whenever the autarky equilibrium is non-trivial), then
Bh
(
pih, piA
)
→ BO
(
pih, p = pA
)
for all pih ∈ [0, 1] as λh → 0 (A3)
Bf
(
pih, piA
)
→ B
(
pif
)
for all pif ∈ [0, 1] as λh → 0,
Assume parameters implying a unique autarky equilibrium, and call it piA. Let pA
denote the associated autarky price. If pi = piA, then BO
(
piA; p = pA
)
= B
(
piA
)
, and piA
solves
pi = G
(
BO
(
pi; p = pA
))
. (A4)
While both (A4) and the autarky fixed point equation have piA as a common solution,
incentives diverge for other values of pi since in autarky the price changes as pi changes
whereas there are no such price effects in (A2). Equation (A4) will therefore in many cases
have solutions different from piA. Now, if piO solves (A4) and if ddpi
∣∣
pi=piA
[pi −G (B (pi))] 6= 0
and ddpi
∣∣
pi=piO
[
pi −G (BO (pi; p = pA))] 6= 0, then, for λh small enough, there exists an
equilibrium
(
pih∗, pif∗
)
in the trade model near
(
piO, piA
)
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